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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

HOWARD F. HATCH
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Appeal No. 20960
-vsR. CRAWFORD DAVIS, and WILLIAM
6. DYER, individually and as General
Partners for REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT
CONSULTANTS
Defendants/Respondents
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. While the plaintiff/appellant has sought relief in the lower
court from torts arising out of business relations between himself and
defendants/respondents (and their attorney acting in their behalf), he has
at the same time asked for a quieting of title to the real property owned
by Real Estate Development Consultants, (REDC), a Utah partnership in which
the respective parties each claim a controlling interest.

Since Section

78-13-1 of the Utah Judicial Code requires that such action "must be tried
in the county in which the subject (property) is situated...", then this
aspect of the case becomes controlling and dictates the proper venue.
2.

Defendants claim that the plaintiff provided "none" of the

elements of a quiet title action in the original complaint.

While these

elements might have been laid out more explicitly, yet they are contained
in the complaint.

Only two elements are absolutely essential:

1

a. That the plaintiff alleges title to the property:

In Para-

graph 4 of the Complaint, plaintiff alleges to being the "legitimate
General Partner of said partnership" (R. 1 ) , a partnership previously
referred to as REDC, the owner of property described in Exhibit "A" of the
Complaint. (R. 4)
b. That the interest claimed by others is adverse or hostile to
the alleged claims of title or interest held by the plaintiff:

In Para-

graph 3 of his Complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendents "have performed
certain illegal acts on behalf of the Limited Partnership", namely,
"contracting to sell (and in fact conveying by warranty deed) property
belonging to the partnership." (R. 3)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. The defendants admit in Paragraph 3 of their Brief, under
Statement of the Case, that Real Estate Development Counsultants is a
limited partnership and "is the undisputed owner of the real property in
question."

The quiet title issue stems not from the name in which record

title resides but who may properly act for the partnership.

If the plain-

tiff is the "legitimate General Partner", the person who is named in the
only Certificate of Limited Partnership on file with the Kane County
Clerk's office, then only he, and not one of the defendants, may properly
sign an instrument conveying or encumbering the partnership property.
2.

Plaintiff does not allege "that defendants wrongfully removed

him as general partner of REDC," as defendant's claim in Paragraph 5 of
their Brief, rather that he, the plaintiff, is the legitimate General
Partner. The fact that Mr. Michael Dyer has presumed to act for the
partnership by executing a warranty deed on behalf of REDC (a copy of which
2

instrument is on record in the Kane County Recorders Office and attached as
Addendum "A") should make it abundantly clear that the interest in the
property asserted by the defendants is adverse to the interest claimed by
the plaintiff.
3. The defendants have failed completely to support their
contention that the "same issues were before the 4th Judical District
Court" in a previously filed action. The only similarity which can be
shown is that they, the defendants, asked for a "distribution of assets
according to Utah State Law" (5th Cause of Action, Addendum "B" attached)
while the plaintiff asked the 6th Judicial District court for an "order
showing forth the proper priority of distribution of further moneys
received by the partnership." (R. 3) But that was only in one of the five
otherwise totally distinct causes.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since the defendents overlooked to make a statement of the facts
or to respond to our statements in the initial Brief, we are unable to
reply to theirs. We would therefore stand on our inital statement and
simply observe that the defendants have provided very little information or
facts to support their assertions, perhaps for obvious reasons.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Contrary to what defendents claim in the second paragraph of
their Summary, the plaintiff has not tried to quiet title in his own name
personally. We both agree that title rests and should rest in the record
name of REDC. But the official county record also clearly shows that it is

3

the plaintiff who is authorized to sign for the partnership.
the defendants nor their attorney is so authorized.

Neither of

And when anyone

presumes to execute deeds on behalf of the record owner other than the one
duly authorized, it creates a very serious title question which must be
settled in a court of law. The form of that action would be a quiet title
action.
And while the defendants' attorney continues to assert that the
issues are "identical" in the two cases, he offers absolutely nno information in support of this bald-faced assertion. The most precursory examination made of the two complaints discloses the fact that on only one
point is there even any similarity (please compare defendants' Complaint
filed in the 4th Judicial District attached as Addendum "B" and plaintiff's
Complaint found in the record, R. 1 through R. 4.)
The action brought by the plaintiff can hardly be called
frivolous when the defendants' attorney is deeding off property belonging
to the limited partnership and refusing to account for funds thus obtained.
As to his proposed alternative, i.e., refiling the case in the 4th
District, this would hardly speed things along if that were the wrong
jurisdiction. The plaintiff has no desire to delay the matter. He obtains
nothing by delay since it is he who has advanced substantial sums of money
to the partnership and is now being deprived of any immediate opportunity
of having that money returned.

4

ARGUMENT
Point I
PLAINTIFF'S TORT CLAIMS STEM FROM A QUIET TITLE ISSUE
WHICH IS CONTROLLING AS TO VENUE.
All of the causes of action brought by the plaintiff stem from the
presumption of the defendants to act for the general partner.

If these

actions by the defendants, Davis and Dyer, are without the foundation of
due process, as the plaintiff alleges, then the plaintiff does indeed have
a case for damages against the defendants. But since these "illegal acts"
grew out of or led up to the deeding of real property, adverse to the
interests of the plaintiff who claims to be the true general partner, it
has as its basis a quiet title action.
The state statute authorizing a quiet title action is set forth
as follows:
78-40-1. An action may be brought by any person against another
who claims an estate or interest in real property...adverse to him
for the purpose of determining such adverse claim. Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended)
Since an action to quiet title can only be brought in the county
where the partnership property lies, then that becomes the controlling
place of trial or venue.
78-13-1. Actions for the following causes must be tried in the
county in which the subject of the action, or some part thereof,
is situated... (1) For the recovery of real property, or of an
estate or interest therein, or for the determination in any form
of such right or interest, and for injuries to real property.
U.C.A. (1953 as amended)
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Point II
THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF ARE IN THE CHARACTER OF THOSE TYPICALLY
HANDLED IN A QUIET TITLE ACTION.
According to 74 C.J.S., Section 1 under "Quieting Title",
The purpose of a suit to quiet title or remove a cloud is to
determine the existing title to property and the validity of
adverse claims thereto.
Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines "quieting title" as follows:
A remedy, originating in equity, enlarged and supplemented in many
jurisdictions by statute, having for its purpose an adjudication
that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to
that of the plaintiff, is invalid, so that the plaintiff and those
claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger
of the hostile claim.
Even though the instant case differs somewhat from a traditional
quiet title action, because the litigants are all partners in the same
partnership, yet the effect sought by the plaintiff is identical with those
described above and so must qualify in the "quiet title" category.

It is

one thing for partners to dispute amoung themselves about partnership
business but when limited partners presume to be general partners without
establishing their legal right to do so by due process, and then issue
deeds on behalf of the partnership, they have clearly set up a hostile
claim against the claims of the legitimate general partner who had heretofore executed deeds on behalf of the partnership.
We would here cite from 65 Am Jur 2d, Section 20, under 'Quieting
Title" (p.158):
In some cases, courts have canceled instruments which have been
executed without authority by executors and administrators, and by
agents, officers, and other fiduciaries, as constituting a cloud
on title.

6

To further clarify the issue we would like to quote the
definition given in Black's Law Dictionary,(4th Edition):
Quiet, v. To pacify; to render secure or unassailable by the
removal of disquieting causes or disputes. This is the meaning of
the word in the phrase "action to quiet title," which is a proceeding to establish the plaintiff's title to land by bringing
into court an adverse claimant and there compelling him either to
establish his claim or be forever after stopped from asserting it.
This is precisely what we seek to do with the action brought
against the defendants.
Point III
THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS ARE PRESENT WHICH CONSTITUTE A QUIET
TITLE ACTION.
In the annotations under "Complaint" in Sec.78-40-1, (Quiet
Title), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended):
A complaint under this section is sufficient which states the
ultimate facts that plaintiff is the owner of the lands and that
defendant claims an interest adverse to him, without setting out
the facts in detail; Glasmann v. O'Donnell, 6 U. 446, 24 P0 537,
applying to C. L. 1888, Section"T468 and following Mining Co. v.
Kerr, 130 U.S. 256,9 S. Ct. 511.
In action to quiet title, plaintiff may allege his title, ownership, and possession in general terms and thereunder may prove
whatever title he has. State v. Rolio, 71 U. 91, 262 P. 987.
Good pleading requires that plaintiff allege, in action to
quiet title, that he was the owner or entitled to possession of
real estate at time of commencement of the action, and that the
estate or interest claimed by defendant is adverse or hostile to
plaintiff's alleged claim of title or interest. Express averments
are not required; it is sufficient if that may be inferred from
the allegations made. Worley v. Peterson, 80 U. 27, 12 P. 2d 579,
applying C.L. 1917, Section IWl and following Tate v. Rose, 35 U.
229, 99 P. 1003.
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Some references say possession must also be claimed but others
make it clear this is not an essential:
Contrary to the rule originally administered by the courts of
equity, our statutory action to quiet title does not require that
a plaintiff allege and prove his possession of the disputed
property. U.C.A. 1953, Section 78-40-1; State v. Santiago, Utah,
590 P.2d 335, 337-38 (1979); Gibson v. McSurrTn, 37 Utah 158, 16566, 106 P. 669, 671 (1910). (Quoted~Trom Wood v. Myrup, Utah
1984, 681 P. 2nd 1255, at p. 1257)
We must reassert what we have said in the Statement of the
Issues:

the Complaint as filed in the 6th Judicial District Court did in

fact contain the necessary elements to sustain a quiet title action. As
our citation from the Utah Code Annotated makes clear, "Express averments
are not required; it is sufficient if that may be inferred from the
allegations made." (Emphasis added) (quoted from Worley v. Peterson, 80 U.
27, 12 P 2d 579.)
The complaint states as follows:
1.

The real property subject of the action is located in Kane

County (Para. 2, R. 1)
2.

The defendants are accused of performing "certain illegal

acts on behalf of the limited partnership" (Para. 3, R. 1)
3.

That partnership is identified as Real Estate Development

Consultants (REDC) in Paragraph 3, (R. 1 ) , a full legal discription being
attached to the complaint as Addendum "A". (R. 4)
4.

Those "certain illegal" acts are identifed in Paragraph 3 as

"contracting with third parties for the sale of partnership property."
5.

That in so doing, they were "claiming an interest adverse" to

those of the plaintiff, i.e. presuming to own or control the property for
the partnership. (Para. 5 and 6, R. 2)
8

6.

And which was "jeopardizing the financial interests of the

plaintiff," by challenging his property rights as the "legitimate General
Partner for said partnership." (Par. 4, R. 1)
The plaintiff's assertion that he, and only he, was the legitimate general partner is his claim to being the "owner" of the subject real
property.

Not that he claimed personal ownership as the defendants would

construe it, but simply that he as the General Partner was solely empowered
to control partnership business, and specifically to "sell or exchange"
partnership property.

(See p. 3 of Partnership Agreement attached as

Addendum "C")
CONCLUSION
Since the action filed in the 6th Judicial District Court had as
its basis a dispute over the control of title to real property, it needed
to be filed in the county where the real property was located.
any other county lacked appropriate jurisdiction.

A court in

The statute says that

"actions...for the the recovery of real property or of an estate or
interest therein, or for the determination Jj^ amy form of such right or
interest," must of necessity be brought in "the county in which the subject
of the action...is situated."

(Judicial Code 78-13-1 U.C.A.)

It was clearly error for Judge Tibbs to rule "improper venue."
We would ask that his Order of Dismissal be set aside and the case be
remanded to the 6th Judicial District Court with instructions.
Dated this h

day of March, 1986.

HOWARD F. HATCH, Pro se
9

ADDENDUM " A "

Recorded at Request of..
at

M. Fee Paid $..

by

Dtp. Book
Page
Ref.:
Grantee,
999 South
South Main, Salt Lake City, UT.
;ee, c/o Myron Child f,f,
999
— Address...
84111

Mail tax nonce to

WARRANTY DEED
, REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS, a Utah L i m i t e d
of
CONVEY S

to

grantor
Partnership
hereby

AND VARRANT S

VOUR WORLD, INC.,, a Utah C o r p o r a t i o n

ft
grantee

$

of Ten dollars and other good and valuable considerationsfor the sum of

8

DOLLARS,

|

o

the following described tract
State of Utah

of land in

Kane

County,

a

All of Parcels No. 14, 21, and 10 of the proposed
^ M
STEVENS CANYON ESTATES, -an unrecorded Subdivison
«1
located in Sections 29 and 32, Township 38 South,
g
Range 8 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. The
>
legal descriptions are provided as follows: (*See Exhibit "AC

Parcel 14
Beginning at a point which is N00°03'W 2,102.43 feet along
the section line and S89o14'07"E 362.68 feet from the Southwest
corner of the Section 29, Township 38 South, Range, 8 West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thense S89°14
G7"E 462.72
#
feet; thence S13°33'W 84.36 feet, thence S08
10'W
396.53 feet;
,
thence - S66°17'E 169.13 feet; thence
S72°53
E
104.02
feet; thence
S46°26 E 143.56 feet; thence S56023*54HW 400.28 feet; thence
N61*18'W 154.75 feet; thence N63°06'W 238.50 feet; thence N15°
27'W 320.27 feet; thence N46°14 'W118.85 feet; thence N04»52'W
126.72 feet; thence N27°42'E 173.31 feet; thence N39°07,E 60.61
feet to the point of beginning.
Containing 9.88 acres.%.
WITNESS, the hand
jJtVJt^ty^i

of said grantor

, this
.A.D. 1 9 ? /

3-1*-

day of

n the Presence of

n

-

\ c$U^
4til_^3^^

STATE OF UTAH,
County of S < ^ v

c A ^

On the
<?*** day of (\CujjyY\\OQ^
personally appeared before m c ^ . V J ^ 0<^p^
the signer
same.

4i

of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that

(w£AAQAfvc...O

• A. D. 1 9 ^
he executed the

2
Notary Public.

My commission expires«^jutsj„ 1 ^ . . . ^ 5 S 5 L Residing in.
•LAM* M«. |<M— - ««v ,,a. c o -

' ••, a.oo , . . r - , . t , ,.»«,

clTr

Parcel 21
Beginning
along

is S89°12 , 38*E 1,367.80

at a point which

the section

corner of Section

feet

line and South 2.0? feet from the Southwest
29, Township

38 South, Range 8 West, Salt

Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence N19*23*W 168.62 feet;
thence S88*15*51*E 233.29 feet; thence N17 # 47 , 46*E 481.81 feet;
thence N77*59'E 579.72 feet; thence S16 0 45 , E 209.98 feet; thence
S41°54'W 244.19 feet; thence S12 # 24 # W 179.29 feet; thence S62°46'rf
174.66 feet; thence S06*33 , E 239.33 feet; thence 5 3 9 * 2 0 ^ 100.88
feet; thence ^ 5 4 * 4 5 ^ 247.44 feet; thenct
thence N87 o 09 f W
S61°04»W

K20°31'W 239.79 feet;

40.50 feet; thence S09°59,W 183.34 fi-etj thence

76.97 feet; thence N62°00'W 150.39 feet to the point

of beginning.
Containing 10.18 acres.
Parcel 10
Beginning at a point which is S86*34 , 14 H E 1324.20 feet
from the West Quarter Corner of Section 29, Township 38 South,
Range 8 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian (the Southwest corner
of said Section 29 bears S00°03 , E 2834.45 feet from said West
Quarter Corner of Section 29); the point of beginning also being
the Southwest corner of the SE1/4 NWl/4«of said Section 29; and
running thence N00°10'50 M E 282.69 feet along the 40 acre line;
thence N45°46'E 182.32 feet; thence S44°31 , E 611.29 feet; thence
S45°29'W 212.83 feet; thence 3 0 7 * 4 5 ^ 249.95 feet; thence S25°15'W 179.51 feet; thence S61°12'W 129.78 feet; thence S50°15 , W
100.28 feet; thence N68°03'W 333.20 feet, thence N27°26'46"E
436.47 feet; thence N00°10 f 50"E 200.00 feet to the point of
beginning.
Containing 10.00 acres.

Exhibit "AM

kZ(p

ADDENDUM "B"

MICHAEL E. DYER
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 700
P.-0. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3 ^

=«

«*• r*
00 « ^

X~

L. c_ m < CO
- c o *

„o

>•&
W £> CQ

o2

R. CRAWFORD DAVIS, an
individual; JANICE DAVIS,
an individual; and
WILLIAM G. DYER; an individual,

O H Q td O
*S
< a.
«Q J w
co<*>

S«
CO

Plaintiffs,

C O M P L A I N T

vs.
HOWARD F. HATCH, an
individual; CASCADE
FALLS CORPORATION,
formerly a Utah Corporation; and REAL ESTATE
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS,
a Utah limited partnership,

Civil No.

C3QJ2*$~

Defendants,
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney, complain of
defendants and for a cause of action allege as follows:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

R. Crawford Davis is and has been a resident of Utah

County at all times material hereto.
2.

Janice Davis is and has been a resident of Utah County

County at all times material hereto.
\A\

4.

Howard F. Hatch is and has been a resident of Utah

County at all times material hereto.
5.
«/

Cascade Falls Corporation was a Utah Corporation until

it was dissolved in 1975 by the Secretary of the State of Utah
for failing to maintain its good standing within the State of
Utah.

Howard F. Hatch was an officer and/or director of

said corporation until its dissolution in 1975.
6.

Real Estate Development Consultants, a Utah Limited

Partnership, (hereinafter referred to as "REDC"), is authorized
H

a5S

c/5 ^o r^ _

2 N .5
a

U2

9
m

j w
»-J r.
H

to conduct business within the State of Utah and has its principal place of business in Provo, Utah County, State of Utah.
7.

On July 15, 1971, the parties entered into a Limited

Partnership Agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto and
<

CO

incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "A".

Plain-

tiffs R. Crawford Davis and William G. Dyer are named as limited
partners in said Limited Partnership Agreement.

Plaintiff

Janice Davis is the wife of the late D. Evan Davis who is
named as a limited partner in said Limited Partnership Agreement
whose interest devolved upon plaintiff Janice Davis pursuant
Y\ and
to said Limited Partnership Agreement and by operation of law.
8.

The initial general partner of REDC was Cascade Falls

Corporation, a Utah corporation.

In November, 1975, the certi-

ficate of limited partnership of REDC was amended with Howard
F. Hatch and Larry Don Smith named as general partners.

A

copy of the amended certificate of limited partnership is

F. Hatch and Larry Don Smith named as general partners.

A

copy of the amended certificate of limited partnership is
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit
"B".
* i*

9.

On or about September 19, 1978 f defendant Howard F.

Hatch purchased the interest of Larry Don Smith, leaving Howard
F. Hatch as the sole general partner of the above-referenced
partnership as indicated in a letter from Howard F. Hatch to
the limited partners, a copy of which is attached hereto and
incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit
10.

"C".

On September 28, 1978, the limited partners purchased

an additional five (5%) percent interest in the limited partnership, leaving each of the limited partners with a fifteen (15%)
percent interest in the limited partnership.

Defendant Howard

F. Hatch holds the remaining twenty-five (25%) percent interest
in the limited partnership.
11.

The principal asset of REDC is approximately 750
•

'

'

••

r

acres of real property known as Stevens Canyon Estates, a plat
of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference
as Exhibit "D". The property was purchased from Mr. C. E.
Meeks and was to be paid off over time from the sale of parcels
of the property.
12.

On information and belief, plaintiffs allege that defen-

dant, Howard F. Hatch, has mismanaged their investment and has
breached his fiduciary duties to them, all to their ecomonic
detriment as set forth below.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Conflict of Interest)
13.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference

paragraphs one through and including twelve of plaintiffs'
.complaint.
14.

As the general partner for REDC, defendant Howard

Hatch engaged in numerous business transactions with other
entities in which he already had significant and substantial
financial interests, creating a severe conflict of interest in
defendant Hatch as the general partner for REDC.
oo r*

|

xZ *
< ^ i

15.

As general partner of REDCf defendant Howard Hatch

transacted business numerous times with Howard Hatch & Associates, an entity over which Howard Hatch had and continues
^£
aO

to have principal if not exclusive control.

3CO

Defendant Hatch

Jo

CO

also worked for or had an interest in Equitable Realty, and,
as general partner of REDC, transacted business with this
entity.

Plaintiffs allege that these conflicts of interest

have adversely affected their ecomonic interest in REDC.
16.

As general partner of REDC, defendant Howard Hatch

has engaged in several business transactions with University
Avenue Development Associates, an entity for which Howard
Hatch is either the general partner or the owner.

Plaintiffs

allege that University Avenue Development Associates loaned in
excess of $42,000 to REDC, and this conflict of interest
has adversely affected plaintiffs' interest in REDC.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty)
17.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference

paragraphs one through and including sixteen of plaintiffs'
complaint,
18.

Pursuant to the limited partnership agreement, the

general partner, already given a fifty percent (50%) interest
in REDC, was not entitled to receive a management fee for his
services.

See Exhibit "A" at 4.

Nevertheless, over the past

11 years, defendant Howard Hatch has, either individually or
through Howard Hatch & Associates, received commissions from
the sales of parcels of real property belonging to REDC.
19.

Not only did defendant Howard Hatch wrongfully awarded

himself commissions in violation of the limited partnership
agreement, the commissions he gave himself were far in excess
of those permitted by realtors generally.

Plaintiffs allege

that, as a general rule, realtors' fees have fluctuated between
5 to 10 percent of the price of the property, 10% coming to a
realtor only in the event of an extremely fine effort to sell
difficult land.

However, for almost every parcel of REDC land

sold, defendant Howard Hatch awarded himself a realtor's commission of at least twenty (20%) percent, and in most cases thirty
(30%) percent.

Said commissions, totaling approximately

$50,000.00, plus interest, rightfully belong to and are assets
of REDC, all to the detriment of the plaintiffs.
20.

Defendant Howard Hatch is and has been a realtor at

all times material hereto, and knew or should have known of
the prevailing realtor's fees for the sale of this type of land.
That defendant Howard Hatch willfully, deliberately, and intentionally awarded himself realtor's fees up to four-hundred
<fc>40Q%) percent higher than the generally prevailing rate cannot,
under any set of circumstances, be considered excusable neglect
or mere negligence.

The defendant has intentionally and

deliberately violated his fiduciary duties of care and loyalty
to REDC and to the limited partners, knowing that the fees he
awarded to himself, either individually or through Howard Hatch
& Associates, unreasonably exceeded those fees typically charged
by all realtors.

This type of willful, deliberate and inten-

tional conduct by the defendant requires the application of
punitive damages in this case.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Self Dealing)
21.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference

paragraphs one through and including twenty of plaintiffs'
complaint.
22.

Defendant Howard Hatch sold to himself two ten acre

parcels of land of REDC, the purchase price of which is presently
unknown.

Plaintiffs allege that any purchases of REDC land by

Howard Hatch must be for the fair market value.

If the price

paid by Howard Hatch for said parcels was less than fair market
value, plaintiffs allege that Howard Hatch should be required
to pay the difference.

23.

Plaintiffs allege that lots 6, 9, 60 and 61 have been

taken off the market by defendant Hatch and "reserved" for
himself.

Thusr while defendant Howard Hatch has not paid for

said lots, said lots have not been available tq the^public for
pale, all to the detriment of the plaintiffs.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Failure to Provide Financial Statements)
24.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference

paragraphs one through and including twenty-three of plaintiffs'
complaint.
25.

The Limited Partnership Agreement requires the defendant

to have prepared by Certified Public Accountant an annual
financial statement containing a balance sheet and an income
statement.

Moreover, a copy or condensed version of such

financial statement as well as the partnership tax returns were
required to be furnished to each member of the partnership at
the close of each accounting year.

The defendant has, however,

failed to provide such formal accounting to the limited partners
on an annual basis, all to the detriment of the plaintiffs.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Distribution of Assets upon Dissolution)
26.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference

paragraphs one through and including twenty-five of plaintiffs'
complaint.
27.

The Limited Partnership Agreement provides for the

following method of distribution of assets upon dissolution:

a.

The expenses of liquidation and the"debts of
the partnership, other than any other debts owing
to the partners, shall be paid.

b.

Such debts of the partnership as are owing
to the partners, including any loans and advances

§P iA\ reimbursement for expenses for the partnership,
shall be paid.
c.

The partner's initial capital contribution.

d

The total of the partner's addition captial
contributions paid pursuant to paragraph 10(a)
hereof.

e.

The remaining proceeds shall be distributed to
the partners to the same extent and in the same
manner that the partners share in the profits
and losses.

f.

Should the general partner cease to act as a
general partner for any reason during the term of
this agreement, he shall be treated as a limited
partner and shall not lose his right to share in
profits and losses in the ratio set forth in Exhibit
,8 M

A .

28.

The above referenced method of distribution is, however,

in direct conflict with the applicable Utah statute which
governs the distribution of assets.

That statute, Utah Code

Annotated, §48-2-23 (1981), states as follows:
1.

Distribution of Assets.
-8-

In settling accounts

after dissolution, the liabilities of the partnership shall be entitled to payment in the following
order:
a.

Those to creditors, in the order of priority
as provided by law, except those to limited
partners on account of their contributions,
and to general partners.

b.

Those to limited partners, in respect to
their share of the profits and other compensation by way of incomes on their

§W

co r^ ;

contributions.
c.

^9 a: I

Those to limited partners, in respect to the
the capital of their contributions.

Those to general partners, other than for capital
6HP«O

and profits.

c/3

Those to general partners, in respect to profits,
f.
29.

Those to general partners, in respect to capital.

The conflict between the above two methods of distribut-

ing assets is immediately apparent.

While parties are typically

j! free to contract according to their desires, the general rule
i|

jj of law does not permit parties to entor into a contract which
'}
•! conflicts directly with applicable state law. In other words,
;j

:j the method of distribution as outlined by Utah State Statute
must prevail oveF^that. outlined in the limited partnership
agreement.
30.

This exact type of dispute was recently litigated in

Dycus v. Belco Industries, Inc., 569 P2d 553 (Okla. App. 1977),
and the court expressly held that the method of distribution as
outlined in the Uniform Limited Partnership Act took priority
over any other agreed upon method of distribution.

The Court

concluded as follows:
"We hold, then that [the general partner's] claim
for advances must take a statutory place behind
creditors^and limited partners." 569 P.2d at 556v/
31.

Plaintiffs allege, therefore, that, upon dissolution,

the assets of REDC should be distributed in the manner provided
by Utah State law.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against defendant,
Howard Hatch as follows:
1.

For an accounting of REDC, the cost of which to be

borne by the defendant Howard Hatch.
2.

For the sum of $100,000, or such other greater sum as

may be proved at trial, as a return of the commissions wrongfully taken by defendant Hatch and for additional actual damages
3.

For a dissolution of the limited partnership, REDC,

with its assets to be distributed according to Utah State law.
4.

For interest at the highest legal rate on all sums

wrongfully taken by the defendants.
5.

For general damages in an amount not less than $10,000.

6.

For punitive damages in an amount not less than $25,000.

7.

For costs of this action, including a reasonable

attorney's fee.

8.

For

such other and further relief as the Court dee.s

just and reasonable in the premises.
DATED this

/ S ^ _ day of February, 1983.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

^ k ^

MI'CH&EL E .
Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs' address
R. Crawford Davis
2765 North 550 East
Provo, Utah 84604
William G. Dyer
3077 Mojave Lane
Provo, Utah 84604
Janice Davis
2585 North 650 East
Provo# Utah 84604

22

oun s e l

for

Portion of Partnership Agreement
real property described on Exhibit "B" at the price indicated thereon. The partnership will pay the general partner for the property the sum indicated on Exhibit ,fB,M
and the general partner is authorized upon conveyance of the property to the partnership to make payment to himself from the partnership assets, the purchase price.

11.

Duties and Management.
(a) The general partner shall contribute his services and experience

Ln connection with the adoption of plans for, and the supervision of the project;
>hall_ devote such time as shall be reasonably required in Jrurtherance of the purposes
md objects^of the limited partnership; and shall cause to be constructed and completed
In a good workmanlike manner any structures to be erected on the subject real property
Ln accordance with such plans and specifications as the general partner shall approve
m behalf of the limited partnership.

Such structures to be constructed within a

•easonable time after execution hereof, due allowance being made for completion of
>lans and specifications, the obtaining of necessary financing, and the issuance of
lecessary permits by the appropriate governmental authority, and shall be diligently
:arried forward to completion.

The general partner shall also use his best efforts

,o obtain the necessary construction financing and shall let the necessary contracts
br construction work for said development.
F*(b) The general partner shall have control of the partnership business
nd all actions shall require the consent of the general partner. The general partner
hall have exclusive control over the business of the partnership and shall have
uthority to act on behalf of the partnership in all matters respecting the partnership,
ts business, and its property, subject to the limitations stated elsewhere in this
greement.

Without limitation upon the generality of the above, the general partner

hall have authority to employ at the expense of the partnership, such agents, land
urveyers and/or

employees, independent contractors, attorneys, and accountants

s they deem reasonably necessary; to sell or exchange, in whole or in part, the
artnership property; to create by grant or otherwise easements and servitudes; to
Iter, improve, repair, raze, replace and rebuild partnership property; to let or
ease property for any purpose, including exploration for and removal of gas, oil and
ther mineral and natural resourses, and for any period; to effect necessary insurance
3r the proper protection of the partnership and of the general and limited partners,
r of any of them; to pay, collect, compromise,, arbitrate, or otherwise adjust any and
LI claims or demands of or against the partnership; and to bind the partnership in
LI transactions involving the partnership's real or personal property or business
"fairs including the execution of all deeds, loan obligations, deeds of trust and
)tes.

The general partner shall devote such time to the business of the.partnership

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that four true and correct copies of the foregoing were
hand delivered or mailed to the attorney for the Defendants by first class
mail, postage prepaid, this /^ day of March 1986 and addressed as follows:
Mr. Michael D. Dyer
CSB Tower
Suite 700
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

Howard F. Hatch

